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Recent Decisions
would abandon the escrow system in view of the current "liquidity
crisis" many lenders are undergoing. 5 Moreover, the payment of
interest on escrow accounts may be a phantom victory for the poten-
tial mortgagor entering the housing market, since the increased
costs of "administration" of the system may well be passed on to
him.
Michael T. Reilly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION- EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX AS A
CRITERION FOR TAX EXEMPTION-The United States Supreme Court
has held that a Florida statute which grants a tax exemption to
widows does not deny equal protection of the law to widowers who
have no such exemption and who qualify in all other respects.
Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
Florida's long extant legislative policy of granting a property tax
exemption to widows is expressed in a current statute which gives
all resident widows a $500.00 exemption from the ad valorem tax.'
Appellant Mel Kahn, a widower, applied to the Dade County Tax
Assessor's Office for this tax exemption. Because the statute does
not offer an analogous benefit to widowers, his application was de-
nied. In a declaratory judgment, the county court found that it was
unable to expand the meaning of "widow" to include both men and
women and held that, since the statutory classification was based
on gender, it was discriminatory and arbitrary and violated the
(c)(12) (1970), defines deposit as including "trust funds whether retained or deposited in...
such bank or . .. another bank."
One case has suggested, though, that if these funds are held under a constructive trust
they are not a "trust" within the meaning of the statute. In re Farmer's State Bank, 675 S.D.
51, 289 N.W. 75 (1939).
95. BUSINESS WEEK, July 6, 1974, at 84.
1. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1885) provided such an exemption. Appellant sought declara-
tory relief under what is currently FiA. STAT. § 196.202 (1973) which provides:
Property of widows, blind persons, and persons totally disabled-property to the value
of five hundred dollars ($500.00) of every widow, blind person or totally and perma-
nently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this State shall be exempt from
taxation.
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equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.' On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stating that all sex
classifications are not necessarily unconstitutional if the classifica-
tion is based upon some difference which has a fair and substantial
relation to the purpose of the legislation. They held that the gender
classification under litigation was one which met the "fair and sub-
stantial" test.' The United States Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction4 and affirmed,5 five justices joining the majority opinion
and three justices dissenting.' The Court concluded that the legisla-
tion falls well within constitutional limits by furthering a valid state
interest to which the sex-based classification bears a fair and sub-
stantial relation.
The importance of Kahn lies less in its approval of a Florida
taxation statute than in its revelation of the Court's approach in
dealing with equal protection challenges to legislation containing
gender classifications. As an indicator of the future of equal protec-
tion analysis of gender classifications, Kahn represents a significant
link between two seemingly divergent views present on the Court.
The first approach is a traditional one in which the Supreme
Court analyzes equal protection challenges to legislation based on
its characterization of the interests involved.7 Statutes dealing with
"fundamental rights"8 or containing "suspect classifications"' have
2. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1973).
3. Id. at 73, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
4. 414 U.S. 973 (1973).
5. Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
6. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall joined in a dissenting opinion, while Justice White filed a separate dissent.
7. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAIv. L. REv. 1067
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments], which analyzes the equal protection reasoning
of the Warren Court and categorizes it as either restrained review or active review. The Burger
Court's evolution from this model is extensively discussed in Gunther, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
8. Fundamental rights are those expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution.
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). To date
the Court has recognized a limited number of such rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (fundamental right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (funda-
mental right to interstate travel); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (funda-
mental first amendment rights); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(fundamental right to procreate).
9. To date the Court has found only race, national origin, and ancestry to be suspect
classifications. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage); Graham v. Richard-
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been subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is an active
review which places the burden on the state to demonstrate a com-
pelling interest in using the classification as well as to show the
unavailability of a less drastic means to accomplish this objective. 0
Because of the double burden, this form of review has been called
strict in theory and fatal in fact." A more restrained review is used
in cases which do not revolve around a suspect criterion or a funda-
mental interest. This review involves a far less stringent burden of
proof, relieving the state of the need to demonstrate a compelling
interest or the unavailability of a less drastic means to accomplish
its objectives. The statute will be upheld if the Court can reasonably
conceive of any valid purpose supporting the constitutionality of the
classification.' 2 Review of this kind has been described as minimal
in theory and virtually none in fact. 3
This two-tiered approach developed throughout the Warren era
and carried over into the early Burger Court." With Reed v. Reed,'5
and several other equal protection cases of the 1971 term, the emerg-
ence of a second equal protection test was postulated." In the area
of sex discrimination, the vacillation between these divergent ap-
proaches to equal protection challenges is apparent.
Reed v. Reed, decided in the 1971 term, involved an equal pro-
tection challenge to an Idaho probate statute requiring the choice
of a male administrator over a female administrator if the appli-
cants were of equal entitlement class. 8 When, under this law, com-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national origin); cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex) (plurality opinion).
10. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Developments, supra
note 7, at 1087-1104.
11. Gunther, supra note 7, at 8.
12. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
See also Developments, supra note 7, at 1077-87.
13. Gunther, supra note 7, at 8.
14. Id. at 8-10.
15. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
16. Gunther, supra note 7. After his analysis of what he considers the fifteen basic equal
protection cases of that term, Gunther concludes that, because of mounting discontent with
its rigidity, the Burger Court is reluctant to expand the two-tiered approach. It is, however,
prepared to use the equal protection clause as an interventionist tool without the strict
scrutiny language of the Warren era. Id. at 11.
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
18. The probate statute. involved in Reed grouped persons by degrees of consanguinity
with the deceased. Mother and father were in one group, sisters and brothers in another,
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peting petitions were presented to the court by the father and
mother of the deceased, the probate court chose the father without
inquiring into the relative capabilities of the applicants. The
mother's appeals brought the case before the Supreme Court which,
in a unanimous decision, declared the statute unconstitutional.
Reviewing the classification, the Court used a standard enunciated
by Royster Guano v. Virginia"9 which stated that, to be valid within
the equal protection clause, a classification "must be reasonable
.. and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation . "... ,2 The
Court found that the statute did not meet this test. Declining to use
strict judicial scrutiny, the Reed Court nevertheless invalidated the
gender-based classification. The "substantial relation" test had the
unanimous approval of the Court and seemed to be the dominant
trend.
It was in this context that Frontiero v. Richardson" came before
the Court in the 1973 term. The case was decided by a divided Court
and focused on the choice of the test to be applied to the statute
involved. The plurality opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Doug-
las, White and Marshall, enunciated the proposition that sex-based
classifications are inherently suspect and, therefore, must be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny.2 The plurality reasoned that, al-
though administrative convenience is a valid governmental interest,
it cannot be the sole basis for the use of a sex-based classification;
when subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, that classification will be
held invalid. 3 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Black-
mun joined in a concurring opinion which refused to go as far as the
grandparents in another and so on. As a result, more than one potential administrator could
be in any given entitlement class.
19. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
20. Id. at 415.
21. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero, a female member of the U.S. Air
Force, sought increased quarters allowance and medical benefits by claiming her husband as
a dependent. Her application was denied because the applicable statutes, 10 U.S.C. §
1072(2)(c) (1970) and 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), required a female member to show her spouse's
dependency for one-half of his support. Not meeting this requirement, she and her husband
challenged the constitutionality of the statutes. The aspect of this case which has received
the greatest attention is the plurality opinion which declared sex to be a suspect criterion,
thereby placing classifications based on sex within the purview of strict judicial scrutiny. For
an extensive discussion of this case and its implications see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
87 HARv. L. REV. 116 (1973); 12 DuQ. L. REv. 982 (1974).
22. 411 U.S. at 688.
23. Id. at 690.
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plurality. They did not include sex in the "narrowly limited group
of classifications which are inherently suspect"; 4 they would have
reversed on the narrower ground that the same result could be
reached through the reasoning in Reed. 5 They would have deferred
categorizing sex as a suspect criterion pending the passage of the
equal rights amendment.26
The clash of the two equal protection approaches in Frontiero left
the state of the law in limbo as to an important issue. In dealing
with equal protection attacks on gender classifications contained in
legislation, would the Court: a) use the two-tiered approach, classi-
fying sex as a suspect criterion and subjecting all such legislation
to strict judicial scrutiny; or b) use the Reed approach with its fair
and substantial relation test. Kahn suggests the answer to this
issue.
The coalition formed in Frontiero, which would have subjected all
sex classifications to strict judicial scrutiny, has apparently been
reduced by one. Mr. Justice Douglas seems to have retreated from
his previous position, leaving Justices Brennan, White and Marshall
as the stalwarts of this view. Kahn signals that the Court is solidly
in the position of refusing to list gender as a suspect classification
which elicits strict judicial scrutiny. 7 Instead, the Kahn Court
asked: Does the differing treatment received by widows and widow-
ers "rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation?"2 This test, which was
24. Id. at 691-92.
25. Id. at 692. These Justices considered it unnecessary to classify sex as a suspect crite-
rion and thereby create far-reaching implications for all such classifications. They felt that
the same result could be reached quite adequately through the reasoning of Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
26. The equal rights amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted
to the states for ratification provides: " Equality of Rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. REs. No. 208,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Justices reasoned that, if adopted, the amendment would
resolve the sex classification issue. Classifying sex as a suspect criterion at a time when the
states are making a major political decision to accept or reject the amendment would pre-
empt the duly prescribed legislative process. Such wide-sweeping social choices should not
be made by the courts at a time when the constitutional processes are at work to put these
very choices to the decision of the people. 411 U.S. at 692.
27. Lower courts have picked up this trend in dealing with challenges to sex-based classifi-
cations. See Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (higher social security
benefits allowed to women); Crawford v. Cushman, 378 F. Supp. 717 (D. Vt. 1974) (automatic
discharge of pregnant female military members); Edwards v. Schlesinger, 377 F. Supp. 1091
(D.D.C. 1974) (exclusion of women from service academies).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 1737, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano
1974
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adopted in Reed, is the focal point of the Court's reasoning in Kahn.
The majority in Kahn applies the test in an almost cursory man-
ner. Mr. Justice Douglas seems to divide the test into three sections:
a) does the differing treatment of men and women rest on some
ground of difference; b) is there a valid purpose served by the stat-
ute; and c) does the ground of difference have a fair and substantial
relation to that object.
The Court finds a valid economic difference between widows and
widowers. Women are, in general, employed in lower paying jobs
than men, and the widow's previous economic dependency and un-
familiarity with the job market she is suddenly forced to enter
magnify the economic disparity.29 Turning discussion to the object
of the legislation, the Court distinguished Kahn and Frontiero. Un-
like Frontiero, in which administrative convenience was the only
justification offered for the classification, Kahn finds a valid state
policy to ease the financial impact of spousal loss upon the widow.
It is upon her and not upon the widower that this loss imposes a
disproportionately heavy burden.30 Having found a ground of differ-
ence and a valid state object, the Court simply concludes that
"there can be no doubt" that the differing treatment of the sexes
created by this statute rests upon a ground of difference which bears
a "fair and substantial relation" to the object of the legislation.'
The application of the Reed test to Kahn was abbreviated, some-
what abstruse, and left the problem of the interrelationships be-
tween the elements of the test unanswered. One reason for this
summary treatment may be that the statute in question involves the
state's power to tax. Taxation statutes, and their classifications,
have been subjected to a distinctive type of scrutiny. The Court
cites several cases which have found that states have wide discretion
in creating reasonable systems of taxation, and that classifications
created within such systems are valid if founded upon a "reasonable
distinction or difference in state policy. ' 32 Demanding exacting uni-
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). It should be noted that this is the same test which
the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stewart would have applied in the
Frontiero case. See note 25 supra.
29. 94 S. Ct. at 1736-37. These conclusions are reached after an extensive statistical
analysis contained in notes 4, 5 and 6 of the opinion.
30. Id. at 1737.
31. Id.
32. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Allied Stores v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1939); Lawrence v. State
Vol. 13: 389
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formity or scientific precision within these classifications would sub-
ject taxation legislation to an intolerable degree of judicial supervi-
sion. 33
A more immediate reason why the Kahn Court did not go into
extensive analysis of their use of the Reed test may be that Kahn
was not chosen as the vehicle to define or clarify the rationale of
Reed.4 Instead, Kahn was used to indicate that, in relation to equal
protection challenges to gender classifications, the "fair and sub-
stantial" test, and not strict scrutiny, would be applied. Unlike the
dissenters who would use Frontiero's suspect criterion reasoning 3 1
the majority seems firmly committed to the use of the Reed test in
this area .3 The precedent existed to adopt either the strict scrutiny
test of Frontiero or the substantial relation test of Reed. The choice
of the Reed test in this instance seems to preclude the adoption of
sex into the category of classifications which are inherently suspect.
Stephen J. Birek, Jr.
Tax Comm'r, 286 U.S. 276 (1931); Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Bell's Gap
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890). The above cases involved equal protection chal-
lenges to the classifications used in state taxation schemes.
33. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930).
34. The Court could have accomplished the same result by simply not granting certiorari.
35. 94 S. Ct. at 1738-40. Both dissenting opinions utilize the strict scrutiny test as exem-
plified by Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In order to justify the use of a suspect
criterion, the state must demonstrate: 1) that the legislation serves an overriding or compel-
ling state interest; and 2) that this interest cannot be achieved by a more carefully drawn
statute or by a less drastic method. Id. at 634-37.
Mr. Justice White found the statute failed to meet either of the requirements of the test.
94 S. Ct. at 1740. Justices Brennan and Marshall found the state did not meet its burden of
proof as to the second requirement and concluded that the statute must fall. More interest-
ingly, however, they found two compelling state interests in this case which allowed the
statute to survive the first element of the strict scrutiny test. The first interest was the
cushioning of the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a
disproportionately heavy burden. The second was the interest in achieving equality for needy
segments of society, long the victims of purposeful discrimination and neglect. Id. at 1738-
40. One issue left unanswered by Frontiero was the kinds of interests that could be compelling
enough to sustain the use of a gender classification if sex were declared a suspect classifica-
tion. Recognition of two such interests as broad as those in Kahn would indicate that reme-
dial legislation could easily meet the compelling interest test.
36. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974) (upheld gender-linked classification using
the Reed test). The dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan and Douglas,
cited Frontiero and demanded a strict scrutiny test be applied to the gender-linked classifica-
tion.

